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I. INASMUCH AS OFFICER SCOTT DID NOT ACT FORTHWITH 
UPON RECEIVING THE TIP PROVIDED TO POLICE DISPATCH 
BUT INSTEAD DELAYED HIS APPROACH PRIOR TO SEIZING 
DEFENDANT'S TRUCK AND BECAUSE OFFICER SCOTT 
EXPRESSLY BASED THE SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT'S TRUCK ON 
GROUNDS OTHER THAN THOSE PROVIDED BY THE INFORMANT, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS 
REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED OR 
WAS ABOUT TO COMMIT A CRIME. 
Giving short shrift to Officer Scott's deliberate delay in 
approaching Defendant's truck, the State, in its Brief, argues that 
Officer Scott, based on the informant's tip, had reasonable 
suspicion to stop Defendant's truck. See Appellee's Brief, pp. 8-
11. For this reason, as well as those set forth in detail below, 
the State's analysis is fatally flawed. 
Contrary to the State's argument, the record reveals that the 
case at bar is not a case where a police officer relied upon the 
information provided by an informant's tip to make an investigatory 
stop. See, e.g., State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Instead, Officer Scott, after responding to the police dispatch 
report, deliberately delayed any action in terms of effectuating a 
stop or seizure of Defendant's truck based upon the information 
provided by way of the tip to police dispatch (R. 68, Transcript of 
Hearing, pp. 13-16). Rather than immediately approaching Defendant 
based on the information provided to police dispatch, Officer Scott 
disregarded the dispatch report and sat back in the patrol car 
4 
parked across the street from the restaurant, observing Defendant 
walk out of the restaurant towards his truck, enter his truck, back 
his truck out of the parking stall, and drive his truck out of the 
restaurant onto a public roadway (Id.). Only then did Officer 
Scott then pull out of the convenience store parking lot where he 
was stationed across the street from the restaurant and follow 
Defendant's truck to apparently observe Defendant's driving pattern 
(Id.). Moreover, only after a right-hand turn by Defendant onto 
250 North, did Officer Scott initiate the investigatory stop of 
Defendant's truck (Id. at R. 68, p. 16, lines 10-13). Even if 
reasonable suspicion existed by way of the tip communicated by the 
informant to police dispatch, such reasonable suspicion dissipated 
upon Officer Scott's deliberate delay and failure to act forthwith 
upon the police dispatch information. See State v. Case, 884 P.2d 
1274, 1277-78 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating that a police officer 
in receipt of dispatched information "may take it at face value and 
act on it forthwith"). Officer Scott's total disregard of the tip, 
together with his subsequent actions in an effort to manufacture 
his own independent basis for reasonable suspicion, caused the 
information provided by the informant to vanish for purposes of the 
seizure of Defendant's truck. 
The fact that Officer Scott's seizure of Defendant's truck was 
not premised upon the informant's tip provided to police dispatch 
5 
is further demonstrated by Officer Scott's own testimony at the 
suppression hearing. At the hearing, Officer Scott testified that 
the basis for stopping Defendant's truck was the alleged improper 
right-hand turn by Defendant (Id. at R. 68, pp. 16-17). The State 
fails to address Officer Scott's plain and clear testimony 
concerning the basis for the seizure of Defendant's truck in its 
Brief. 
Notwithstanding the State's assertion that the facts in City 
of St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), are 
similar to those in the instant case, a close review, quite 
frankly, reveals otherwise. For example, the police officer in 
Carter, contrary to that in the instant case, took the information 
provided by the informant through police dispatch at face value and 
acted on it forthwith. Id. at 169.l In addition, the officer in 
Carter, unlike Officer Scott in this case, relied upon the 
information provided by the informant to police dispatch to 
!The fact that the police officer in City of St. George v. 
Carter, 945 P.2d 165 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), took the information 
provided by the informant at face value and acted forthwith is 
evinced by the facts of the case set forth in the Court's 
opinion, which indicate that the officer, upon receiving the 
relayed information, located and parked behind the defendant's 
vehicle and activated the overhead lights of the patrol car. Id. 
at 167. Further, the Court's opinion states that the information 
provided by the informant and relayed by police dispatch "was 
verified by Officer Whipple, who located the described location 
within minutes of receiving the information from dispatch." Id. 
at 169. 
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initiate the stop. Id. at 167, 169, and n.2. Finally, Officer 
Scott, unlike the officer in Carter, testified at the suppression 
hearing that the basis for the stop was something other than 
information provided by the informant. 
II. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES IMMEDIATELY 
PRECEDING THE SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT'S TRUCK AS WELL 
AS THE TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE 
SUPPRESSION HEARING DEMONSTRATE THAT OFFICER SCOTT 
DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT 
HAD COMMITTED OR WAS IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING OR 
WAS ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT A PUBLIC OFFENSE. 
The State, in its Brief, failed to address the issue of 
whether the alleged improper right-hand turn provided Officer Scott 
with the requisite justification under the Fourth Amendment for 
stopping Defendant's truck. Moreover, the State essentially failed 
to respond to the assertion that Officer Scott, during the course 
of the suppression hearing, failed to point to specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warranted the intrusion. See State v. 
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)); See also State 
v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing Florida 
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983)); Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968); and State v. 
Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984)). 
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Notwithstanding Officer Scott's assertion that he based the 
stop of Defendant's truck on an alleged improper right-hand turn, 
Officer Scott's own testimony at the suppression hearing, among 
other things, established that Defendant in the course of making 
the right-hand turn did not cross over into any other lane of 
travel. The testimony elicited during the suppression hearing 
further established that Defendant's truck is a full-size, three-
quarter ton truck with a camper shell on the back that is difficult 
to turn close to a curb or edge of the roadway (R. 68, Transcript 
of Hearing, pp. 23-24).2 Indeed, the testimony at the suppression 
hearing established that by turning too close to the curb one might 
create an unreasonable risk to the public. Id. Accordingly, the 
size of Defendant's truck provides what could be considered an 
innocent explanation for the manner in which Defendant had to turn 
his truck in order to safely complete the turn. State v. Tetmyer, 
947 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Additionally, the manner 
in which Defendant initiated the turn could have been affected by 
Defendant's nervousness at the time he was being followed by 
Officer Scott in the marked patrol car. 
As part of the totality of the circumstances to be considered 
in the instant case is the fact that Officer Scott did not observe 
2Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-66(1) provides that "both a right 
turn and an approach for a right turn shall be made as close as 
practical to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway." 
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any unusual conduct on behalf of Defendant in the course of 
observing Defendant exit the restaurant and enter his truck (R. 68, 
Transcript of Hearing, pp. 14-15). Furthermore, Officer Scott, in 
the course of following Defendant, did not observe Defendant engage 
in any driving techniques or patterns indicative of an intoxicated 
driver. These circumstances should have operated to mitigate 
against any suspicions of intoxication. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d at 1161 
n.l. 
By virtue of the application of the search and seizure 
principles of law and authority to this case, the totality of the 
circumstances immediately preceding the stop of Defendant's truck 
does not support a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was involved 
in criminal conduct. Rather, the circumstances presented in this 
case "describe a very large category of presumably innocent 
travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were 
[the Court] to conclude that as little foundation as there was in 
this case could justify a seizure." Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 
441, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 2754 (1980). The record reveals that the 
conduct relied upon by Officer Scott to initiate the stop of 
Defendant's truck was not indicative enough of criminal activity to 
establish articulable reasonable suspicion. Cf. , e.g., State v. 
Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); State v. 
Sykes, 840 P.2d 825, 828 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); and Trujillo, 739 
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P.2d 85, 89-90 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Because Officer Scott did not 
articulate reasonable objective facts for suspecting Defendant had 
engaged in or was about to engage in criminal conduct, the balance 
between the public interest in crime prevention and constitutional 
right of Defendant to personal security and privacy tilts in favor 
of Defendant to protect him from the unreasonable police 
interference. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that previously submitted 
by way of Brief of Appellant, Defendant respectfully asks that this 
Court reverse the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Evidence and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this Court's opinion so that Defendant's 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures might be effectuated. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant need not request oral argument inasmuch as oral 
argument is currently scheduled for March 22, 1999, at 9:30 a.m. 
Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of 
disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the 
10 
Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value 
in future search and seizure cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [j/f) day of March, 1999. 
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ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(11). 
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